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Security of quantum key distribution against sophisticated attacks is among the most important
issues in quantum information theory. In this work we prove security against a very important class of
attacks called collective attacks (under a compatible noise model) which use quantum memories and
gates, and which are directed against the final key. Although attacks stronger than the collective
attacks can exist in principle, no explicit example was found and it is conjectured that security
against collective attacks implies also security against any attack.
a. Introduction Quantum cryptography is one of the
most surprising consequences of processing information
using quantum two-state systems (qubits) instead of clas-
sical bits. Quantum key distribution was invented 14
years ago [1], to provide a new type of solution to one of
the most important cryptographic problems, the trans-
mission of secret messages.
For many years physicists and computer scientists have
been trying to prove the security of various quantum key
distribution schemes. Many particular “simple” cases
where analyzed, such as the intercept-resend attacks and
the individual particle attacks, for which there is a clear
intuition that classical privacy amplification provides the
desired security, but no explicit bound on the informa-
tion available to an eavesdropper has been proven. The
security in case of the general joint attacks which are
using quantum gates and quantum memory and are di-
rected against the final key was also considered in several
works (see [2,3] and references there in). In this paper we
complete the work started in [4,5,2] to conclude that the
four-state scheme [1] for quantum key distribution is se-
cure against any collective attack (an important subclass
of the joint attacks) under a compatible error model.
In the four-state scheme Alice sends to Bob a classical
string of length n′′ using a quantum channel, by sending
qubits; she sends either |0〉z or |0〉x = (|0〉z + |1〉z)/
√
2
to encode a bit value 0, or she sends either |1〉z or
|1〉x = (|0〉z − |1〉z)/
√
2 to encode a bit value 1. Alice
and Bob are also connected by a classical channel which
is insecure but unjammable. At a later stage Alice tells
Bob (classically), regarding each qubit, whether she used
the z basis or the x basis. If Bob has used the same basis
for his measurement, they keep the bit (which is sup-
posed to be the same as Alice’s), so they are left with n′
similar bits. Alice and Bob now estimate the error rate
using some (ntest) test bits. If the estimated error-rate
ptest is less than some pre-agreed threshold pallowed, then
the test succeeds and Alice and Bob obtain a final key
from the remaining n-bit string (where n = n′ − ntest),
by performing error correction and privacy amplification.
They choose parities of k substrings for error-correction
and parities of m substrings for privacy amplification.
The parity of each of the k substrings is announced in
order to correct the string, and the parities of the m sub-
strings are kept secret, and used as the final key. We
consider m = 1 in the following and leave the general
case to a review paper.
In the most general (so called “joint”) attack, Eve can
do whatever she likes (the most general unitary trans-
formation using an ancila) to the qubits, and delay all
her measurements till receiving all classical data. We re-
strict ourself to “collective” attacks [5] where each qubit
is attached to a separate probe (unentangled to the other
probes), and the measurement is delayed, and is per-
formed collectively on all probes, after all classical data
is obtained. There are good reasons [5,2] to believe that
collective attacks are the strongest joint attacks (when
n is large). Furthermore, no particular joint attack was
shown to be stronger than collective attacks. In a collec-
tive attack, after Alice sends n′′ qubits to Bob, each is
attached to a separate probe by Eve. Then, the global
state of the Eve-Bob system is ρ1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρn′′ where each
ρi is a density operator on the space HEi ⊗ HBi where
the spaces HEi and HBi belong respectively to Eve and
Bob.
b. Bounds on information We shall first fix some no-
tations from information theory. Let B andX be random
variables (describing the input and output of a channel).
When the context is clear we write p(b) for p(B=b) and
p(x) for p(X = x). The joint probability p(x, b) satisfies
p(x) =
∑
b∈B p(x, b) and p(b) =
∑
x∈X p(x, b). The con-
ditional probability is denoted by pb(x) ≡ p(X =x|B=b)
and px(b) ≡ p(B = b|X = x). It satisfies the Bayes
formula pb(x)p(b) = p(x, b) = px(b)p(x). The mutual
information between the input and the output proba-
bility distributions, I(X ;B) = −∑b∈B p(b)log2p(b) +∑
x∈X p(x)
∑
b∈B px(b)log2px(b), tells us the increase of
knowledge about the input, if the output becomes known
to us.
For a binary input B with equal input probabilities
I(B;X) =
∑
x∈X p(x)I2(px(0)), where I2(p) = 1 +
p log
2
p+(1−p) log
2
(1−p). Distinguishing the input when
the output is given, is then equivalent to distinguishing
the two probability distributions p0(x) and p1(x). All the
probability distributions in the expression of the mutual
information can be calculated from p0(x), p1(x), so we
can define another function SD, Shannon Distinguisha-
bility, SD(p0(x), p1(x)) ≡ I(B;X) (restricted to binary
1
input with equal probabilities).
Suppose we are given a state (density matrix) ρ. The
most general measurement giving a result x in some
set X of possible outputs is given by a POVM [6] in-
dexed by X , i.e. a family E = (Ex)x∈X of Hermitian
operators Ex with non negative eigenvalues such that∑
x∈X Ex = 1 . The probability of occurrence of x given
the state ρ is then equal to pE(x) = Tr(ρEx). Given
two equally likely states ρ0 and ρ1, and a measurement
procedure E , let pEb (x) = Tr(ρbEx); for any given E
let SDE(ρ0, ρ1) ≡ SD(pE0 (x), pE1 (x)). The maximum in-
formation we can get regarding the state we are fac-
ing is given by the optimal Shannon Distinguishability
SD(ρ0, ρ1) ≡ supE [SDE(ρ0, ρ1)] where the supremum is
taken over all POVM’s on all possible sets X.
Unfortunately, there is no known analytic formula giv-
ing optimal mutual information. In what follows, we will
present two bounds which are simple to state and to de-
rive, and which will be found very useful.
Theorem 1. — If ρ˜0 and ρ˜1 are two density matrices de-
fined on some space H1 ⊗ H2 and ρi = Tr2(ρ˜i) are the
density matrices onH1 obtained by tracing-outH2, then,
SD(ρ0, ρ1) = SD(Tr2(ρ˜0), T r2(ρ˜1)) ≤ SD(ρ˜0, ρ˜1) . (1)
Proof. — If E = (Ex)x∈X is a POVM on H1
then E ⊗ 1H2 ≡ (Ex ⊗ 1H2)x∈X is a POVM
on H1 ⊗ H2 and Tr1(Tr2(ρ˜i)Ex) = Tr(ρ˜i(Ex ⊗
1H2)). Consequently SD
E(Tr2(ρ˜0), T r2(ρ˜1)) =
SDE⊗1H2 (ρ˜0, ρ˜1). By definition of the optimization pro-
cess supE [SD
E⊗1H2 (ρ˜0, ρ˜1)] ≤ supE˜ [SDE˜(ρ˜0, ρ˜1)], and
thus, SD(Tr2(ρ˜0), T r2(ρ˜1)) ≤ SD(ρ˜0, ρ˜1). The ρ˜b will
be called a lift-up of ρp, and it is known as purification if
it is a pure state.
This theorem (proven independently in [8]) actually
states that tracing out cannot increase information. It
provides a useful upper bound on the mutual informa-
tion that can be obtained about mixed states ρi, if we
can find appropriate states ρ˜i. A similar idea which says
that mixing cannot improve information was used in [2]
to obtain a more limited security result.
For any two density matrices ρ0 and ρ1 we can de-
fine Tr|ρ0−ρ1| the trace-norm of the Hermitian operator
ρ0−ρ1. In our context where we only consider Hermitian
matrices, Tr|A| is nothing but the sum of the absolute
values of the eigenvalues of A. It is relatively easy to cal-
culate the trace-norm of ρ0−ρ1. Therefore, the following
upper bound is very important.
Theorem 2. — For any two density matrices ρ0 and ρ1,
SD(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ 1
2
Tr|ρ0 − ρ1| . (2)
Proof. — In order to prove this equation (see also [7]) let
us first fix some measurement procedure E = (Ex)x∈X .
Then SDE(ρ0, ρ1) = I(B;X) =
∑
x∈X p(x)I2(px(0)),
where (from the Bayes formula) px(0) = p(B =
0)p(X = x|B = 0)/p(x) = (1/2)pE0 (x)/p(x). Knowing
that I2(r) ≤ |2r − 1| for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 we conclude
that SDE(ρ0, ρ1) ≤
∑
x∈X p(x)|2px(0) − 1|. Assign-
ing px(0) into the last expression [and using p(x) =
(pE0 (x) + p
E
1 (x))/2 in the following equality], we ob-
tain SDE(ρ0, ρ1) ≤
∑
x∈X p(x)|2[pE0 (x)/2p(x)] − 1| =
1
2
∑
x∈X |pE0 (x) − pE1 (x)|. Now, since ρ0 − ρ1 is Hermi-
tian, it can be diagonalized and consequently written in
the form ρ0−ρ1 =
∑
λj |j〉〈j| where |j〉 is an orthonormal
basis and Tr|ρ0 − ρ1| =
∑ |λj |. Clearly Tr(|j〉〈j|Ex) =
〈j|Ex|j〉 and so pE0 (x) − pE1 (x) = Tr((ρ0 − ρ1)Ex) =∑
j λj〈j|Ex|j〉. Using the last expression for SD and
using 〈j|Ex|j〉 ≥ 0 (since Ex is positive definite), we can
now deduce SDE(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ 12
∑
j |λj |
∑
x∈X 〈j|Ex|j〉 =
1
2Tr|ρ0 − ρ1|. Since E is arbitrary, we choose the one
which optimizes SD and this concludes the proof.
c. Error versus information Let us assume that Eve
is powerful enough to control the natural noise. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that Eve’s probes are
in some arbitrary but fixed initial (tensor product) pure
state, and that each probe is in a state |E〉. In the col-
lective attack, the state |E〉 ⊗ |b〉 is subjected to Eve’s
unitary transformation U that changes the state |b〉 sent
by Alice to the final global state
|0〉z 7→ |Ez0,0〉|0〉z + |Ez0,1〉|1〉z ≡ |φz0〉 (3a)
|1〉z 7→ |Ez1,0〉|0〉z + |Ez1,1〉|1〉z ≡ |φz1〉 (3b)
where the |Ezi,j〉 are Eve’s non normalized states. Im-
plicitly, this description corresponds to restricting natu-
ral noise to follow the spirit of the collective attacks. It
is reasonable to suspect that more general noise models
would not be to Eve’s advantage.
Bob’s error probability in the z basis [measuring |0〉z
if |1〉z was sent etc.] is pze = (1/2)[〈Ez0,1|Ez0,1〉 +
〈Ez1,0|Ez1,0〉]. Alice can also use the alternate basis x,
and then the transformation U can also be expressed
in the x basis (replacing everywhere z by x) to yield
pxe = (1/2)[〈Ex0,1|Ex0,1〉 + 〈Ex1,0|Ex1,0〉]. Since Alice uses
both bases with the same probability, Bob’s overall prob-
ability of error is pe =
1
2 (p
x
e + p
z
e) and so p
x
e ≤ 2pe and
pze ≤ 2pe. Due to linearity of the transformation U we
obtain |Ex0,1〉 = 12 [(|Ez0,0〉− |Ez1,1〉)+(|Ez1,0〉− |Ez0,1〉)] and
|Ex1,0〉 = 12 [(|Ez0,0〉 − |Ez1,1〉)− (|Ez1,0〉 − |Ez0,1〉)]. If we ex-
pand pxe in terms of the vectors in the z basis we get p
x
e =
(1/4)[〈Ez0,0−Ez1,1|Ez0,0−Ez1,1〉+〈Ez1,0−Ez0,1|Ez1,0−Ez0,1〉].
Since U preserves inner products, the states |φz0〉 and |φz1〉
have norm 1. Therefore, 〈Ez0,0|Ez0,0〉+〈Ez0,1|Ez0,1〉 = 1 and
〈Ez1,0|Ez1,0〉+ 〈Ez1,1|Ez1,1〉 = 1, which we use to get
pxe =
1
2
[1−Re{〈Ez0,0|Ez1,1〉+ 〈Ez1,0|Ez0,1〉}] . (4)
Eve’s view is obtained by tracing-out Bob from the
states φzb (if the z basis was used): ρ
z
0(E) = |Ez0,0〉〈Ez0,0|+
|Ez0,1〉〈Ez0,1| and ρz1(E) = |Ez1,0〉〈Ez1,0| + |Ez1,1〉〈Ez1,1|.
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Many other pure states (purifications) also yield the same
reduced density matrices for Eve. In particular
|ψz0〉 = |Ez0,0〉|0〉z + |Ez0,1〉|1〉z (5a)
|ψz1〉 = |Ez1,1〉|0〉z + |Ez1,0〉|1〉z (5b)
will prove useful since the angle between them is zero if
there is no disturbance. While these states have only
virtual existence, they will be used in Theorem 1 to
yield the desired bound, since Eve’s states are the trace-
out of these pure states. They live in some Hilbert
space HE ⊗H2, with H2 two-dimensional Hilbert space.
They are normalized, and consequently |〈ψz0 |ψz1〉| =
cos(2αz) for some angle 0 ≤ αz ≤ pi/4. Moreover,
there is some phase angle θ such that eiθ〈ψz0 |ψz1〉 =
|〈ψz0 |ψz1〉|. Let |Ψz0〉 = |ψz0〉 and |Ψz1〉 = eiθ|ψz1〉. One
can now find two (normalized) orthogonal states |0zH〉
and |1zH〉 (spanning a two dimensional subspace H of
HE⊗H2) such that |Ψz0〉 = cos(αz)|0zH〉+sin(αz)|1zH〉 and
|Ψz1〉 = cos(αz)|0zH〉− sin(αz)|1zH〉. From 1−2 sin2(αz) =
〈Ψz0|Ψz1〉 = |〈ψz0 |ψz1〉| = |〈Ez0,0|Ez1,1〉+ 〈Ez1,0|Ez0,1〉| we de-
duce that Re{〈Ez0,0|Ez1,1〉+ 〈Ez1,0|Ez0,1〉} ≤ 1− 2 sin2(αz).
Using (4) we get that Eve’s state is a partial trace of one
of the pure states |Ψzb〉 with angle satisfying sin(αz) ≤
(pxe )
1/2.
Everything that has been said about |ψzb 〉 and pxe holds
by symmetry for replacing the bases, yielding sin(αx) ≤
(pze)
1/2. Using pxe ≤ 2pe and pze ≤ 2pe, we obtain
sin(αz) ≤ (2pe)1/2 and sin(αx) ≤ (2pe)1/2. In the se-
quel we will simply drop the indices x and z, taking as a
convention that we are dealing with the actual basis that
Alice and Bob agreed upon (and which become known
to Eve only after she retransmitted the particle towards
Bob).
d. The state in Eve’s hands We now look at the n′
remaining qubits after Alice and Bob discard those bits
where the bases did not agree. Some bits are used to
verify that ptest ≤ pallowed, to be left with n-bit string x.
From the previous paragraph, we know that after retrans-
mitting the i-th bit (namely, xi) to Bob, the purification
of Eve’s state is |Ψxi〉 = cos(αi) |0〉i+(−1)xi sin(αi) |1〉i,
where xi is either 0 or 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n) according to the
bit which Alice sent to Bob, and |b〉i would be |bHi〉
in the notations of the previous paragraph. Moreover
sin(αi) ≤ (2pi)1/2, where pi is Bob’s probability of er-
ror on the i-th bit (averaged over the four possible input
states), which is completely determined by Eve’s trans-
formation. The global state of Eve’s probes is, thanks to
the properties of the trace, a partial trace of |Ψx〉, the
tensor product of the |Ψxi〉.
To expand |Ψx〉 we first need some notations. Boldface
letters like j, x are used to denote strings in {0, 1}n that
are interpreted as n-vectors on the binary field. Boldface
letters are also used in kets, with the following under-
standing: if j = j1 . . . jn is concatenation of n bits then
|j〉 = |j1〉1 . . . |jn〉n where |b〉i are the basis vectors of
the purifications of Eve’s i’th qubit. The state |Ψx〉 =⊗n
i=1[(cos(αi) |0〉i + (−1)xi sin(αi) |1〉i)] can be written
as |Ψx〉 =
∑
j∈{0,1}n dj(−1)x·j |j〉, where dj = dj1 . . . djn
with dji = cosαi if ji = 0 and dji = sinαi if ji = 1, and
where x · j is by definition x · j = ∑ni=0 xiji mod 2 . For
instance, |Ψ01〉 = cosα1 cosα2|00〉 − cosα1 sinα2|01〉 +
sinα1 cosα2|10〉 − sinα1 sinα2|11〉. We let j ⊕ k be the
string obtained by adding j and k bit by bit with the un-
derstanding that 1⊕1 = 0. Then [using (−1)x·j(−1)x·k =
(−1)x·(j⊕k)], the lift-up of Eve’s density matrix is
ρ˜x = |Ψx〉〈Ψx| =
∑
j,k∈{0,1}n
djdk(−1)x·(j⊕k) |j〉〈k| , (6)
for any string x sent by Alice.
e. The parity bit In order to encode one key-bit b (0
or 1) using a substring of the n bits she sent, Alice pro-
ceeds as follows: she chooses some string v ∈ {0, 1}n to
define the relevant (privacy amplification) substring, and
announces it to Bob; Bob understands that the key-bit
sent is b = x · v, and can calculate the final bit b. Eve
now knows v (but not x) and has to guess b = x · v.
Only strings x such that x · v = b shall contribute to
ρ˜vb ≡ 2−n+1
∑
{x|x·v=b} |Ψx〉〈Ψx|. To learn b Eve needs
to distinguish between the two density matrices (in her
hands) ρvb for which ρ˜
v
b are lift-ups. For convenience let
us define ∆v ≡ ρ˜v0 − ρ˜v1 , and in the following we evaluate
the trace-norm of ∆v.
Using (−1)b = (−1)x·v and (6) we get ∆v = (−1)0ρ˜v0+
(−1)1ρ˜v1 = 2−n+1
∑
j,k djdk
∑
x(−1)x·(j⊕k⊕v) |j〉〈k| . We
now simplify the preceding sum using a technique similar
to the one of [5]. If j⊕ k⊕ v 6= 0, there is some string y
such that (j⊕ k⊕ v) · y = 1. If we let x′ = x⊕ y then
(−1)x′·(j⊕k⊕v)+(−1)x·(j⊕k⊕v) = 0 and since x 6= x′ (be-
cause y 6= 0) all the coefficients of |j〉〈k| cancel in pairs.
If j⊕ k⊕ v = 0, then (−1)x·(j⊕k⊕v) = 1 for all x and
since there are 2n such strings, we get
∆v = 2
∑
i⊕j=v
didj |i〉〈j| = 2
∑
j∈{0,1}n
djdj⊕v |j〉〈j⊕ v|. (7)
If i⊕ j = v then clearly j⊕ i = v. Therefore, ∆v is a
sum of 2n−1 Hermitian matrices didj|i〉〈j| + djdi|j〉〈i| =
didj[|i〉〈j| + |j〉〈i|]. For each of them the Trace-norm is
2didj = didj + djdi. Using this result and the triangle
inequality (which is satisfied by any norm) we obtain
Tr|∆v| ≤ 2
∑
i⊕j=v
didj = 2
∑
j
djdj⊕v . (8)
If vi, the i
th bit of v equals 1, then the product of the
ith factor of dj by the i
th bit of dv⊕j is cosαi sinαi, since
either [dji = cosαi and dji⊕vi = sinαi] or alternatively
[dji = sinαi and dji⊕vi = cosαi], since ji ⊕ 1 = not(ji).
The contribution of such terms is (sin 2αi) since the sum
is over all j so the term djdj⊕v contributes twice. If vi,
3
the ith bit of v equals 0, then the product of the ith fac-
tor of dj by the i
th bit of dv⊕j is either cos
2 αi or sin
2 αi.
When summing over all j, such terms sum up to yield 1.
As result the sum reduces to
∑
j djdj⊕v =∏
vi=1
sin(2αi)
∏
vi=0
1 =
∏
vi=1
sin(2αi). If we look at
v as the characteristic function of a set also denoted v,
one can write i ∈ v instead of vi = 1 and
Tr|∆v| ≤ 2
∏
i∈v
sin(2αi) . (9)
Due to (2) and (1) we get SD(ρv0 , ρ
v
1 ) ≤ SD(ρ˜v0 , ρ˜v1) ≤
Tr|∆v| ≤ 2∏i∈v sin(2αi), if the error correction data is
unknown to Eve.
f. Error correction For error correction, a number of
linear constraints are imposed on the bits of x. More pre-
cisely, Alice chooses a system E = {v1 · x = b1,v2 · x =
b2, . . . ,vr · x = br} of r linear equations such that the
r + 1 strings v, v1, . . . , vr are linearly independent and
each bi is either 0 or 1. We write E(x) to mean that x
satisfies the system (that is, x is a code word).
We can now define ∆E,v as in the previous sec-
tion with ρ˜E,vb an equal mixture of the states |Ψx〉〈Ψx|
such that x satisfies the system {x · v = b} ∪ E.
This system has 2n−r−1 solutions and so ∆E,v =
2−n+r+1
∑
j,k djdk
∑
E(x)(−1)x·(j⊕k⊕v) |j〉〈k|. As in the
previous section, the expression for the Trace-norm can
be simplified. For any s ∈ {0, 1}r let vs denote the
element
∑r
i=1 sivi. If j⊕ k⊕ v = vs and x is a so-
lution of E, then the exponent x · (j⊕ k⊕ v) in the
above expression for ∆E,v reduces to (
∑r
i=1 sivi) · x =∑r
i=1 si vi ·x =
∑r
i=1 sibi = s · b. This value is indepen-
dent of x and so the coefficient of |j〉〈k| = |j〉〈k ⊕ v ⊕ vs|
is 2djdk⊕v⊕vs(−1)s·b where b is the string (bi)1≤i≤r of
the parity bits in the equations of E. If j⊕ k⊕ v is not in
the span of {v1, . . . , vr} then there is a solution y to the
system {(j⊕ k⊕ v) · y = 1, v1 · y = 0, . . . ,vr · y = 0}.
For any x solution of E, let x′ denote x⊕ y. Clearly x′ is
also a solution of E and (−1)x·(j⊕k⊕v)+(−1)x′·(j⊕k⊕v) =
0, and consequently the coefficient of |j〉〈k| is 0. There-
fore
∆E,v = 2
∑
j,s
djdj⊕v⊕vs(−1)s·b |j〉〈j⊕ v ⊕ vs| , (10)
generalizing Eq. (7) to contain the error correction data.
Consequently ∆E,v =
∑
s∈{0,1}r(−1)s·b(ρ˜v⊕vs0 − ˜ρv⊕vs1 ).
As before we define ∆v⊕vs for the terms in the paren-
thesis, and these terms are given by Eq. (7) [and
their Trace-norm is given by Eqs. (8) and (9)] once
v there is replaced by v ⊕ vs. This gives ∆E,v =∑
s∈{0,1}r(−1)s·b(∆v⊕vs), and due to the triangle in-
equality Tr|∆E,v| ≤ ∑s∈{0,1}r Tr|∆v⊕vs |. Using the set
notation and Eq. (9) we finally get
Tr|∆E,v| ≤ 2
∑
s∈{0,1}r
∏
i∈(v⊕vs)
sin(2αi) . (11)
Due to (2) and (1), we get SD(ρE,v0 , ρ
E,v
1 ) ≤
SD(ρ˜E,v0 , ρ˜
E,v
1 ) ≤ Tr|∆E,v| ≤ 2
∑
s∈{0,1}r
∏
i∈(v⊕vs)
sin(2αi)
when the error correction data is known to Eve. Us-
ing sin(2αi) ≤ 2 sinαi ≤ (8pi)1/2 we finally get
SD(ρE,v0 , ρ
E,v
1 ) ≤ 2
∑
s∈{0,1}r [
∏
i∈(v⊕vs)
(8pi)]
1/2.
Let the “Hamming weight” nˆs (for each s) be the num-
ber of one’s in v ⊕ vs [the number of factors in the prod-
uct
∏
i∈(v⊕vs)
]. Also let ps = [
∑
i∈(v⊕vs)
pi]/nˆs be the
average error in any relevant subset s. The geometrical
mean of the pi contributing to ps is always less than their
arithmetical mean so [
∏
i∈(v⊕vs)
(8pi)]
1/2 ≤ [8ps]nˆs/2,
and thus SD(ρE,v0 , ρ
E,v
1 ) ≤ 2
∑
s∈{0,1}r [8ps]
nˆs/2.
Given that the test is passed ptest ≤ pallowed statisti-
cal analysis promise us that each of the ps is bounded.
Combining two laws of large numbers of Hoeffding [9],
Theorem 2 (sums of independent random variables) and
its extension in section 6 (sampling from a finite pop-
ulation), we are promised that pn′ , the average pi of
all n′ relevant bits satisfies Prob[pn′ > ptest + 2δ] ≤
2e−2ntestδ
2
(since the tested bits are picked at ran-
dom). Once pn′ is bounded we can bound ps as fol-
lows: let n′ be even [throw one bit if needed (before
choosing the bits for the test)], and let Alice and Bob
use ntest = n
′/2 bits for the test. We then have
ps ≤ (n′/nˆs)pn′ . Thus, Eve’s information is generously
bounded by 2
∑
s∈{0,1}r [(8n
′/nˆs)(ptest + 2δ)]
(nˆs/2), ex-
cept with a probability of pluck = 2e
−2ntestδ
2
. Recall
that ntest = n = n
′/2. Assuming (generously again)
that in such a case of having luck Eve’s information is
maximal (one bit) her total information is bounded by
2
∑
s∈{0,1}r [(16n/nˆs)(ptest +2δ)]
(nˆs/2) +2e−2nδ
2
, for any
δ. Let αn = nˆ = mins nˆs. Then, SD(ρ
E,v
0 , ρ
E,v
1 ) ≤
2r+1[(16/α)(ptest+2δ)]
αn/2+2e−2nδ
2
. Entering into cod-
ing theory is beyond our aim in this letter and is left for
the full paper: for error rates below 2%, many codes al-
low us to choose the parameters n, r, α and δ such that
Eve’s information is negligible [e.g., 2−100 of a bit].
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